A draft-cavage hs2019 signature leaves the hash to the key: with an RSA key it is tried with SHA-256, as nearly everyone
signs, then with SHA-512, as some do; rsa-sha256 stays SHA-256 only. A Digest of SHA-512= is checked as SHA-256= is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LsXgEaXee4GCU1hwYgPJXw
S6 of the roadmap. An inbox POST is refused unless its signature covers
(request-target) and host, as well as the digest and a date or (created).
The Date or (created) may be at most an hour old and fifteen minutes ahead
(it was twelve hours either way), and an (expires) in the past is refused.
The request target is read raw from the server, so a percent-encoded path
verifies as the sender signed it.
Tests cover a Mastodon-shaped delivery and each way of tampering with it,
plus a round trip of our own outbound signature.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012CzABvBkbcFqoHdmi8b9WB
thepraandClaude Opus 5.5